This study models demand by owner-occupied housing ''stayers.'' Most consumers do not move routinely in response to small changes in income or housing price, so the ''own᎐rent'' and ''move᎐stay'' decisions are modeled as multiperiod optimization in the presence of transaction costs. The empirical section uses the ''American Housing Survey'' to provide a panel of household stayers for a metropolitan area. Results indicate that income and value-rent measures in different years have separable and significant impacts on housing demand. Estimated conditional income elasticities are between 0.40 and 0.45. ᮊ 2001 Elsevier Science
HOUSING DEMAND WITH TRANSACTION COSTS
The economics of housing demand have evolved substantially over the past four decades. Major improvements in measuring price and income terms, the joint modeling of tenure choice, mobility, and demand, and the availability of large databases have sharpened our estimates.
However, most models, and particularly empirical estimates, have remained static in nature. Consumers are viewed at one point in time. If they move during the observation period, they are often considered to be ''closer to equilibrium,'' and their housing demand is estimated jointly with the decision to move. If they Ž . do not move, their tenure choice own or rent is often estimated jointly with housing demand, under the premise that they are ''out of equilibrium,'' but that this disequilibrium is not severe enough to overcome the sizable transaction costs that moving entails.
Such analyses are at variance with the anecdotal wisdom that suggests that consumers:
1. have well-defined expectations as to future incomes and price changes, 2. are fairly well informed about the transaction costs of changing housing locations, and 3. face transaction costs for owner housing that are higher than for renter housing.
These distinctions may explain some of the discrepancies between broadly measured housing expenditures in the aggregate, which have often indicated income elasticities close to q1.0, and the microeconomic elasticities generally closer to 0.5. The aggregate measurements internalize most of the tenure choice and mobility effects. The microeconometric measures must model the tenure choice and mobility effects explicitly.
This study provides a discrete-time consumer optimization model with transaction costs. It demonstrates comparative statics results from this model, showing how they vary from simpler models, and it links the comparative statics with mobility analysis. It then proposes econometric techniques to estimate the model and presents a database that has been created from the Ž w x. ''American Housing Survey'' AHS, 26 . The primary finding is that in a multiperiod model the impacts of incomes and price variables from different periods are separable and significant. These impacts indicate the importance of looking at housing stayers when modeling housing demand.
2. MULTIPLE PERIOD FRAMEWORKS w x Goodman 10, 11 derives a model in which the transaction costs of changing dwellings are essentially infinite. The two-period framework in those two pieces, while useful for exposition, ignores the decisions on how long to stay w x and how often to move. Goodman 12 reformulates a key aspect of the earlier analyses that links the static housing demand model to mobility analysis and considers a multiperiod model, showing the equilibrium conditions, demonstrating that they are unique, and presenting comparative statics. w x Models of transaction costs in adjusting activity levels are not new. Hu 17 considers the appropriate adjustments to capital stock when the transaction w x costs are large. In housing analysis, Muth 21 examines moving costs in the w x context of long-term housing expenditures. Amundsen 2 considers the optimal number of moves when a consumer has perfect foresight and can access perfect capital markets. He shows how the number of moves is related to moving costs, income, and preferences for housing, and he demonstrates, under simplified conditions, that the moves are equally spaced. These models do not address several aspects of housing analysis. The first is consumer choice under imperfect capital markets. The permanent income hypothesis suggests that consumers can easily borrow against future earnings, but ''real life lenders'' are not so accommodating. The considerable literature on liquidity constrained borrowing suggests major capital market imperfections, particularly early in peoples' earning lives.
The second aspect involves linkages between demand and mobility. Most models view consumers either as purchasing housing services in equilibrium or as moving when out of equilibrium. How are the two linked, and what indicators can be used to predict mobility?
Third, consumers' utility functions may change over time, particularly with respect to life cycle variables such as family size, number of children, and retirement. A discrete-time model permitting parameterization of the relative demands for housing and other goods allows a more realistic characterization of the path of housing consumption.
The following Lagrangian equation examines the utility foregone by not moving in response to changed economic conditions:
If housing prices or utility functions differ in the two periods, or if discount rate and interest rate r differ, then the immobility constraint is binding and Ž . represents a cost in terms of foregone utility that can be related to moving costs. 3 In equilibrium, consumers will adjust housing purchases such that the Ž . difference between the marginal rate of substitution MRS and the price ratio p , weighted by the marginal utility of income in Period 1, equals the negative 1 of the similar term in Period 2. This difference equals the disutility imposed by the constraint that the consumer must stay in the same unit. Multiplier can Ž . Ž . be eliminated from Eq. 2 or 3 , so that
Ž . Ž . The equivalence between 3 and 3Ј allows one to examine multiperiod optimizations since it relates the number of moves and the probability of moving to disutility stemming from moving costs.
Equilibrium foregone utility * is easily related to the foregone utility that Ž would occur due to a moving cost m henceforth expressed in terms of . foregone utility through reduction in disposable income between the two periods. If * ) m, this implies a move each period, trading disposable income reduction m for the greater gain in utility.
Also, * provides a way to look at changes in prices, incomes, or tastes. Ž . A at h*, with immobility cost *, implies that the Period 1 housing purchase is too large and the Period 2 housing purchase is too small relative to the unconstrained mobility case.
Consider now an increase in p to p X . At previous equilibrium level h*, the
Ž . left-hand side expression 1 q r MRS y p is now less than y MRS y p . In response to the price change, housing quantity h must decrease so that MRS Ž .Ž X . increases each period. At the new equilibrium point B, 1 q r MRS y p s 1 1 Ž . y MRS y p , but the new equilibrium is at h**, which is less than h*. The 2 2 price increase in Period 1 reduces the quantity demanded in both periods and the immobility cost increases from * to ** because the absolute difference between p and p has increased. A consumer previously at the margin 1 2 between moving and staying may now choose to move. One can see that had Ž . Ž . Ž X . p decreased approaching p , the 1 q r MRS y p curve would shift to intersect at h U with the immobility cost now equal to 0, since the immobility 2 constraint has become nonbinding. 4 Consider instead a consumer optimizing over T periods. The transaction cost of moving each period is m . If a consumer, at time 0, plans to move each t period, the discounted sum of future utilities is
and the budget constraint each period is
Ž .
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Staying in the same unit for two or more periods permits the consumer to save Ž . moving costs, while again incurring immobility in terms of foregone utility 4 w x Goodman and Wassmer 14 solve a two-period model with perfect capital markets and Cobb᎐Douglas utility function for the utility loss due to the immobility constraint.
costs. Given the multidimensional vector of incomes, prices, and preferences, the consumer solves for: A five-equation model is used to address these questions. The first two equations establish instruments to be used for permanent income and housing Ž price. The third and fourth equations jointly estimate tenure choice owner᎐ . renter status and mover᎐stayer status. The final equation estimates housing demand conditional on staying in the same dwelling unit.
Permanent income estimates follow the cross-sectional method proposed by w x Goodman and Kawai 13 , as return r on human capital vector H and return r h n on nonhuman capital vector N:
h n Ž . Substituting Eq. 6 into the identity that current income Y equals the sum of its
Here, the predicted value of the regression on human capital variables, including age, education, gender, and race, and nonhuman capital variables, including financial assets, is taken as permanent income. The residual is treated as transitory income Y T . Housing prices are estimated with hedonic price equations following the formula
Ž . where V R s the value rent of the dwelling unit, depending on the vector X of housing attributes and the location G. House and rental price indices are calculated over geographic areas G for standardized bundles X * such that
Estimating consumer behavior suggests a joint relationship between housing Ž . tenure ownrrent and the probability of being in the sample four years hence Ž . w x the moverstay decision . The two are relatedᎏShelton 24 
The correlation of and is denoted by .
f g Ž . w x The specification of tenure choice 9a follows Goodman 9 . All else being equal, increased income Y and length of stay L are likely to predict owner housing, and the D terms such as household size, age, gender, or race of head of household may reflect tastes. 6 Goodman distinguishes between the owner᎐renter price ratio P rP and the value᎐rent ratio VrR. For comparable o r Ž . Ž . Ž . dwelling units with attributes X *, an increase decrease in P X* rP X* is o r Ž . expected to predict renter owner status.
In contrast, VrR is derived to reflect expected housing investment Ž . Ž . returnsᎏhigh low VrR is expected to predict owner renter status for Ž w x. specific dwelling units Goodman 9 . Through a well-specified function, one Ž . Ž . can reconstruct any renter owner unit as if it were owned rented . Since Ž hedonic coefficients can be interpreted as the sums of replacement costs Rosen w x.
Ž w x. 23 and quasi-rents Kain and Quigley 18 , a set of high quasi-rents for a specific bundle suggests a market-indicated expectation for capital gain. Holding the relative prices for standardized units constant, the value᎐rent ratio compares units for investment potential.
Ž . Specification of the stayer equation 9b follows the theoretical derivation of Ž . Ž . Eqs. 2 and 3 , which indicate that differences over time in explanatory variables such as income and housing price may impose higher staying costs. The terms refer to ''spreads'' of incomes, prices, and value᎐rent ratios, the variables D referring to sociodemographic variables that may reflect tastes, and L refers to the length of stay in the residence. Since it is postulated that owners are more likely to stay, the simultaneity between housing tenure and probability of staying is estimated in correlation between f and g.
Conditional on ''staying'' in the 1989 sample, 7 owner and renter housing demand are
As derived from the theoretical model, multiple measures of income, housing price, and value᎐rent ratio are included for each of the three years. Variables f Ž . Ž . and refer to the selection adjustments derived from Eqs. 9a and 9b . refer to owner᎐renter probability and the subscript g refer to mover᎐stayer 6 Length of stay may plausibly be treated as endogenous. Doing so at this time is beyond the scope of this analysis. 7 When subjects move, they are lost to the 1989 sample with respect to estimating demand.
probability. Then let
The probabilities of individual cells for stayers are
where ⌽ refers to the bivariate normal distribution.
b Selection adjustments and for individual observations are calculated
' '
where
Since variables such as income are used in several stages of the estimation, it is important to show how they are used to calculate marginal impacts and elasticities. Because relatively few renters in the sample stay in the same unit for more than eight years, the analysis concentrates on the demand of owner᎐stayers. Expected housing demand is the probability of being an owner᎐stayer multiplied by the amount of housing demanded by those who are owner᎐stayers. Following Greene, identify the tenure choice regression as f and the mover᎐stayer regression as g. Then let the vector x s x j x and let
The bivariate probability reflecting owner᎐stayer status is
Ž . addition, a variable such as income Y, which appears in one or more probability equations, will influence q o w n through its presence in and . 9 The effect i f g of a 1% income increase on q o w n , for example, is
The derived percentage change in ⌬ q o w n thus represents the income elasticity.
i From the theoretical model it follows that one should model a permanent Ž . increase in income for example as a one-dollar increase in each of the three years. Similar effects, using multiple measures of housing price or value᎐rent ratio, can be derived for other ''economic'' variables. Estimating separate significant coefficients for income in different years within the same equation would provide separate effects over time, as predicted by the theoretical model.
A ''naıve'' model will also be estimated, using a cross-section sample witḧ only single-period variables for housing quantity or expenditures. Such a model Ž . Ž . is not nested within Eqs. 10a or 10b because it uses only a single-period, rather than a multi-period, measure of housing quantity and because it cannot model the mover᎐stayer selection adjustment, rendering it part of the error term. Nonetheless, it provides a useful benchmark for comparisons.
SAMPLE
Ž . The American Housing Survey AHS was chosen because it provides details on both the dwelling units and the households within them that are not available in other databases. 10 Moreover, the methods developed are replicable on AHS databases for other metropolitan areas. parameter and y is the dependent variable conditional on selection. He writes ''it is quite possible w x that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the full effect might all be different from w x w x those of the estimate of the direct effect ␤ . . . '' 15, pp. 928᎐929 . In an e-mail to the author, w U U x Greene indicated that Ѩ E y N f , g ) 0 rѨ x is exceedingly difficult to sign, but calculating the
incremental impacts depends only on the ability to evaluate and at incremental levels of the f g explanatory variables.
10 Ž . This feature contrasts with a database like the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics PSID that is explicitly panel, but which contains only limited housing data and even less geographic detail.
It is essential to show how the household database was constructed because Ž . the AHS follows dwelling units each with a unique identification number rather than individuals. One cannot assume without additional information that the same household is occupying the dwelling unit. Although other studies have utilized the panel nature of the dwelling units, it is unknown whether any have attempted to take advantage of the panel nature of the households.
Due to confidentiality concerns the AHS does not provide geographic identifiers on its publicly available files. As a result, dwelling unit location within a metropolitan area is limited to central city, suburb, or county indicators. For example, all houses in the city of Detroit have identical unit prices for a given year, and identical unit prices four and eight years later. 11 When the project started, the Detroit MSA surveys were available for 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, and 1989 . Because of survey procedure changes, the study was limited to 1981, 1985, and 1989. Some dwelling units were rotated out of the survey, so the demand analyses used only households from dwelling units included in all three. Thus households outside of Wayne, Macomb, and Ž . Oakland Counties the three counties in 1981 were not used. With no reason to believe that units were systematically rotated out of the sample, there is no reason to assume selection bias.
The fundamental criterion for matching indicated when the household had Ž . 11 Unit prices do change from period to period. Inclusion of additional metropolitan areas in this estimation process would presumably alleviate lack of price variation. 12 The entire set of matching criteria and procedures are available from the author upon request. 13 There is potential for error since HA may have moved out anytime after 1985, and the unit may have been vacant, or occupied by someone else, before HB moved in. This suggests that the spell lengths for those identified as movers, at the time of their moves, may be biased slightly upward.
One of the major premises is that households continue to live in the same unit, consuming roughly the same quantity of housing. Even with ''perfect'' measurement, housing quantity may change within the same unit due to renovation or depreciation. Over 8 years these magnitudes will be small, although they could compound to larger amounts over longer periods.
Housing 
RESULTS

a. Income and Price
For permanent income, separate owner and renter regressions were estimated Ž for each year for all households in the AHS database rather than simply for Ž . A criticism of Eq. 7Ј is that the error u may contain systematic components attributable to unmeasured skills or effort. These components cannot be identified in cross-sectional regressions, but can be estimated for households for whom there is more than one observation. For households in the sample for two Ž . Ž . or three years, u s u q u r2 or u s u q u q u r3 was calcu-ˆˆˆ2   81  85  3  81  85  89 lated, as appropriate. Systematic effects u or u were then added to the fitted 2 3 Ž . values u of Eq. 7Ј for each year as permanent income and subtracted from û as transitory income. Housing prices and value᎐rent ratios were derived from hedonic price Ž w x. regressions estimated in semi-log form Thibodeau 25 . Separate regressions were estimated by year and for differing tenures, but geographic submarkets were modeled solely with binary variables. The 1980s saw considerable population loss in the City of Detroit relative to the rest of the metropolitan area, and Ž this is indicated by steep house price discounts y33.6%, y46.5%, and . y56.6% for the three years.
Renter hedonic price regressions were also estimated for 1981, 1985, and 1989. Detroit rents were not as steeply discounted, although they were 19.7%, 10.9%, and 21.2% less than in surrounding areas in the three years, respectively.
The price indices used the arithmetic mean of owner and renter bundles as w x Ž . X *. Indices P and P apply the Duan 5 ''smearing'' factor s s Ý exp e rn, where e s y y x ␤ refers to estimated residuals, to retransform semi-loĝ
Ž . estimates from Eqs. 8a and 8b : Value᎐rent ratios for individual units are created by statistically matching Ž . owner units with renter units with the same characteristics using Eqs. 8a and Ž . 8b . Because the vectors of coefficients were allowed to vary by dwelling unit, there was considerably more variation in value᎐rent ratios than in housing prices.
Returning to Table 1 
b. Naıve Demand Regressions
It is useful to describe the data with naıve demand regressions, specifying thë regressions as if they were cross-sectional demand regressions. Because the multiyear models concentrate on owner housing, this section concentrates on owner regressions. A linear functional form is used, with no selection adjust-Ž . Ž . Ž . ment for owner vs renter housing. In Table 2 , columns 1 , 3 , and 5 refer to current income regressions for 1981, 1985, and 1989, respectively. Columns Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 2 , 4 , and 6 refer to permanent and transitory income regressions for the three years. 14 The regressions presented here have varying numbers of observations since they included households that were in the sample for only one period. Ž . In Table 2 , estimated current income elasticities vary from 0.240 in 1989 to Ž . Ž 0.459 in 1981 ; permanent income elasticities are higher as high as 0.616 for . 1981 . Decomposing current income into permanent and transitory income improves the regressions' explanatory power. Transitory income has from one-half to two-thirds of the impact of permanent income.
Housing price is expected to have a negative impact on quantity demanded, and the value᎐rent ratio is expected to have a positive impact. These predicted Ž . effects occur for 1985 price elasticity of approximately y0.31 and 1989 Ž . price elasticity of y0.43 to y0.44 , but not for 1981. The combined impacts of 1% changes in housing prices and value᎐rent ratios yield housing demand increases varying from 0.372 to 0.552%. 15 15 The reported joint impacts of price and value᎐rent ratio with respect to housing demand and w x ownership, here and elsewhere in this article, are consistent with Goodman's 9 findings.
The sociodemographic variables are age and race of household head and marital status. Increased age is positively correlated with housing demand in Ž 1981, but negatively correlated in 1989 the 1985 coefficient is negative but . insignificant . Blacks purchased less owner housing in 1981 and 1985 than did whites, but the coefficients are not statistically significant: they purchased more in 1989, but those coefficients too are insignificant. Married households purchased more housing than did unmarried households in all three years, but when permanent income was taken into account this difference, too, is insignificant. In sum, the results provide cross-sectional price and income elasticities that are consistent with estimates from the housing demand literature. Tables 3 and 4 Table 3 presents the bivariate probit analyses of tenure choice and mover᎐stayer status. 16 Columns 1 and 2 use the current income in both the tenure choice and the mover᎐stayer relationships. Columns 3 and 4 decompose current income into its permanent and transitory parts for each relationship. The decomposition of current income into permanent and transitory parts yields a statistically significant improvement in explanatory power by likelihood ratio criteria. 17 Both estimates are discussed, and both are used in the subsequent demand estimation stage.
c. Multiyear Models
The validity of the joint estimation of tenure-choice and mover᎐stayer status Ž is supported by the significant disturbance correlation 0.413 for current . income; 0.430 for permanent income , indicating that ownership was correlated with staying and renting with moving. In the current income version, the unconditional mean probability of owning, given staying, was 0.898; the unconditional mean probability of staying, given owning, was 0.748. The joint Ž . probability of staying in owner housing, using Eq. 12 to account for the correlation of the error terms, was 0.700. Ž Increased 1981 and 1985 incomes, included in either current columns 1 and . Ž . 2 or permanent columns 3 and 4 form, are separately correlated with owner rather than renter housing. Transitory income has a significant impact in 1981, but an insignificant impact in 1985. Married households are more likely to own. Black households are also more likely to own, although the coefficients are not 16 The bivariate probit analysis was done with LIMDEP Version 7.0, and the calculation of the selection variables and was performed through a subroutine available from LIMDEP.
f g 17 The current income estimates impose four coefficient restrictions, compared to the permanent Ž . 2 Ž . and transitory income estimates. Twice the difference in log-likelihood functions ; 4 . The test statistic of 9.998 is larger than the 95% critical value of 9.488. Note. Standard errors are given below the coefficients.
significant. The impacts of owner᎐renter price ratios and value᎐rent ratios are reversed from the theoretical predictions, with an increase in the owner᎐renter Ž . price ratio P rP implying homeownership and an increase in the value᎐rent o r Ž . ratio VrR implying renter status. This reversal likely occurs because of the Ž limited variation in the ratios there are only four values of the price ratio for . Ž each year . The joint effect of the two variables 1% increases in both P rP o r . and VrR , obtained by adding the coefficients, implies a tendency toward homeownership.
Most previous work, including the author's own, has found age to be positively related to ownership. Here, however, controlling for length of stay in the residence, older residents are more likely to rent. This seemingly unusual finding can be interpreted by adding two coefficients. For the current income relationship, an additional year of age has the impact of y0.010; spending that year in the same residence has the impact of 0.097. The net impact is 0.087, a positive impact implying ownership. Older households with shorter stays in the unit are more likely to rent.
The second part of the bivariate probit analysis examines the determinants of ''staying.'' In addition to incomes, prices, and sociodemographic variables such as age, race, gender, and marital status, the theoretical model implied that Ž changes in the ''economic'' variables were likely to increase the costs in terms . of foregone utility of staying, holding moving costs constant. After several Ž . specifications, percent absolute change for income, price ratio owner᎐renter , < and value᎐rent ratio were chosen such that for variable z, PCH z s z y 85 < z rz . Mean values are given in Table 1. 81 81
The resulting estimates provide mixed support for the model as specified. Ž Absolute income levels had little impact on the mover᎐stayer status positive . coefficients implying stayers in either estimate. Older households were somewhat more likely to stay, as were married households, although not significantly so. Black households were significantly more likely to stay than whites. Length of stay as of 1985 had a positive impact on staying, indicating that whatever Ž had satisfied the household thus far generally continued to satisfy them such . 18 that they stayed .
Percentage change in income implied increased likelihood of moving, although the impact was not significant. Changed owner᎐renter and value᎐rent ratios both had positive impacts on staying, although the theory would suggest that they would be correlated with moving. The impacts of these variables may reflect the Detroit area in the 1980s. There was considerably more price appreciation in the suburbs than in the city. To the extent that suburban households were happy where they lived, they chose to stay there. Table 4 displays linear owner demand regressions. 19 Columns 1 and 2 use the current income bivariate probit as the selection equation; columns 3 and 4 use the permanent income bivariate probit for selection. The theory presented earlier suggests separate impacts for 1981, 1985, and 1989 income levels, and the cases are similar for prices and value᎐rent ratios. Preliminary work using three separate house price indices for 1981, 1985, and 1989 indicated that owner prices were almost perfectly correlated across the three years, due to the lack of price variation within jurisdictions. Moreover, due to the multicollinearity there were almost no changes in relative city᎐suburb prices over the three years. To address this multicollinearity problem, the owner price term was collapsed into a single three-year average term. 18 The AHS contains subjective evaluations of house and neighborhood quality that might Ž . plausibly be related to the decision to move less satisfied residents may move . These proved statistically insignificant when included in the ''mover᎐stayer'' equation. 19 Renter regressions were also estimated, but the sample size of 60 did not provide satisfactory results, given the need to use 12 regressors. The small sample size is unsurprising since it required that renters spend at least 9 years in the same dwelling unit.
Concentrating first on columns 1 and 2, R 2 was 0.474 for the current income regression and 0.473 for the permanent income regression. Tenure choice Ž . Ž . LAM TEN and mover᎐stayer LAM STAY ratio are jointly significant and ᎐ ᎐ positively related to demand in both regressions. The joint significance indicates conditioning on sample selection, and the possibility of biased coefficients if selection is ignored. 20 The three income coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% levels, even though they, too, exhibited considerable collinearity. The three-year average price term is also statistically significant, as are two of the three value᎐rent ratios.
Since sociodemographic variables were either identical for all three years or Ž . explicitly correlated i.e., age , only the 1989 value was used. Older households purchased slightly more housing than did younger households. Black households purchased 3 to 4% more housing and married households 4 to 5% more. None of these variables are statistically significant.
Columns 3 and 4 use the permanent income probit equations for selection. In contrast to the current income probits, the mover᎐stayer LAM STAY is now ᎐ statistically insignificant, although tenure-choice LAM TEN remains statisti-᎐ cally significant. The R 2 measures are slightly smaller than columns 1 and 2 and the income coefficients are slightly larger. The price coefficients are Ž smaller and are not statistically significant at the 5% level although the column . 4 price term is significant at the 10% level . The sociodemographic variables are still insignificant, although Black households now purchase between about 5 and 8% less housing than do white households. Table 5 presents income and price elasticities. The income variables are more satisfactory, possibly because they are more accurately measured. Recall that the income elasticity
implies that a 1% increase in income affects the quantity for those who own, both through income coefficients and through their indirect impacts on the selection parameters and . Ermisch 7 . He found that, given observed attributes, owner-occupiers are more likely to be stayers and that households with unobserved attributes that Ž . Ž . make them more likely to move stay have lower higher housing demand, while households with unobserved traits that increase their probability of owning have higher housing demand. The price elasticities are calculated with the single price term. For the demand estimates conditional on current income bivariate probit selection, the Ž . owner demand price elasticities are y0.4553 current income, column 1 and Ž . y0.4908 permanent income, column 2 respectively. For the demand estimates conditional on permanent income bivariate probit selection, the price elasticities are smaller in absolute terms, y0.1289 and y0.2435 for the current income Ž . Ž . column 3 and permanent income column 4 demand formulations, respectively. The positive value᎐rent ratio elasticity is consistent with its interpreta-Ž tion as a measure of user cost of capital the higher the value᎐rent ratio, the . lower the user cost, and hence the higher quantity demanded . The joint effect of 1% increases in house price and value᎐rent ratio is positive.
What is most important in the context of the multiperiod model is that the individual year impacts are generally separable and significant. Moreover, the formulation provides substantive support for the premise that it is appropriate and useful to look at the housing stayers.
CONCLUSIONS
This article presents a framework in which the explicit mover᎐stayer decision is modeled as an equilibrium decision. An ''old-style'' database has been ''rebottled'' to provide a panel of households for which there are very good household data and unmatched housing data.
The results indicate that income and value᎐rent measures in different years have separable and significant impacts on housing demand. The conditional income elasticities provide values between 0.40 and 0.45. Price impacts on demand are less helpful, in part because of difficulties in measuring housing price using the AHS in a single metropolitan area, even over a period of eight years. However, the three-year average price elasticities are plausible.
From a policy perspective the separable income impacts help to interpret key features of demand-side programs such as housing vouchers that have been proposed to address problems of adequate housing for the poor. The Experi-Ž . mental Housing Allowance Program EHAP and successor programs were w x w x predicated on time-series income elasticities of Muth 20 , Reid 22 , and others finding income elasticities greater than q1.0 and as high as q2.0. As w x Goodman 10 notes, repeated analyses using individual data have generally found income elasticities to be less than q1.0 and most of the analyses from the EHAP project found them to be closer to 0 than to q1.0. The general appraisal was that the EHAP experiments were too short in duration, that the income subsidies were not necessarily viewed as permanent, and that moving costs might constrain adjustment. 21 Although the demand estimates presented here pertain to owner demand, the findings suggest some validity to the criticism that single-year income measures tend to underestimate responsiveness to income changes. Moreover, they Ž suggest that temporary income changes such as one-year income increases in . the model estimated can be expected to have only modest impacts on housing demandᎏprograms must promise permanent changes. In short, income subsidies andror vouchers must be expected and they must be long-term.
It would be useful to add another year and several other metropolitan areas to Ž . the database. Even with the three observations 1981, 1985, 1989 , the absolute deviation spreads in income, housing price, or value᎐rent for stayers are limited Ž . to differences in two years. Another year hence another interval , most likely after 1989, would add information on the variable ''spread.'' Similarly, adding metropolitan areas might provide additional variation in prices across metropolitan areas as well as within them.
It will also be important to take advantage of the current database and to look Ž . more explicitly at those who entered the sample after 1981 the first year , as well as those who were in the sample in 1981, but moved before 1985. Examining the duration of peoples' stays, as well as the housing demand therein, with mixed estimation models would seem to be yet another fruitful extension of the database and econometric modeling techniques. 
